Robert Korstad: ...talk about how...

Dick Boone: Just lead me, I'm just a sheep.

RK: Okay. Maybe you could just discuss for us where you see the intellectual foundations of the efforts of OEO.

DB: Well the intellectual efforts of first the President's Committee on Delinquency which was in a sense the forerunner of the community action concept really rested in part with what I call the Chicago School, both insight sociology and criminology. But even prior to that the real underpinning I think came from Frank Tennenbaum who was not a criminologist. He was a labor historian at Columbia. He wrote a book called *Crime and the Community* which in a sense was revolutionary because it implicitly took issue with theories of causation at that time. Basically we were in the middle of the reign of Freud which permeated a great deal of both social work theory and practice. It was the time of the psychiatric social worker still focused on the individual, the so-called deviant individual. And the notion was if this person is deviant, this person is delinquent, this person is criminal there must be some personal maladjustment involved in this. The psychiatric case worker, the job of the psychiatric case worker was to make this discovery and either to provide or recommend treatment. In major part, group work had not even been discovered. Along comes Tennenbaum and suggests that a great deal of delinquency and crime, particularly in the city, shouldn't seem unusual to us because it's part of a social ( ) and an expectation in certain communities whether it's based upon the gang or other kinds of activities. That there is both an immediate social cause for this
activity and as well as a tradition. Tennenbaum suggested that the real tragedy in this was not so much that young people got involved in this but, I'm paraphrasing now, but that some of them got caught. That if they weren't caught they would probably live through that period of their lives and ultimately move out of that activity into so-called legitimate careers. But if they were caught they became captured by the criminal justice system. They became identified and branded by that system and as a result of that the chances of their moving out into a legitimate world were dramatically lessened. Well, this sort of notion was a clear and present challenge to the notions of the time and I would say that the Chicago people picked that up and led with it so to speak. I kind of came under the tutelage of a criminologist by the name of Joseph Lowman who is a lecturer at Chicago. He basically embodied this and it was really part in parcel of the Chicago School of Sociology. He won a grant to do something called the Illinois Selective Service Felon Study which was a study of what happened to men who had been felons following their release from prison and parole, into the armed services, what happened to them in the armed services and what happened to them after they came out. I was fortunate enough to be a field interviewer in that process. A gentleman by the name of Lloyd Olin was the research director of the project. And Olin in a sense was part of this tradition too. So it was a very rich period of intellectual life. After the Illinois Selective Service Felon Study was over and I think Olin was at that
point getting his Ph.D. at Chicago, if I remember correctly, he moved on to Columbia where a person by the name of Dick Clower teamed up with him and they produced a kind of a landmark book in the field called *Delinquency and Opportunity* which was basically in the tradition that I've just talked about. It really woke up a lot of people. There was a much greater dialogue about the issue of delinquency and causation and so on at that point. The first testing out of that theory came in a program called Mobilization for Youth in New York City. It was a community based program to increase the opportunities for young people to move in legitimate ways and away from the attraction of crime and delinquency. I won't go into the history of Mobilization for Youth. I'll just say that in this process David Hunter at the Ford Foundation and Dike Brown who is Vice-President of Ford Foundation also discovered Olin. This was all New York based at that time and this was about the time that Kennedy had just won the election and was preparing to take over the presidency and everybody knows that Bobby Kennedy, Robert Kennedy was very prominent in that process. As Robert Kennedy became Attorney General he picked up some interest and concern about the delinquency issue and I guess there were conversations between him and a gentleman by the name of David Hackett who was a very, very close friend and the two had gone to school together. Hackett had been in the campaign and had been a key player in the boiler room of the campaign. When that was all over it was obvious that the two really wanted to work together. To make a long story short, Robert
Kennedy asked David Hackett to head up a program to deal with delinquency. To my knowledge, Hackett had no real prior experience in this area which frankly might have been good. A wonderful man who had no ego problems and who had this wonderful knack of understanding what he didn't know and really seeking advice rather than to cover it up. I don't remember how the contact came about between him and Hunter and Dike Brown, but he was seeking advice and contacts and they led him to Olin. He was very impressed with Olin and he basically asked Olin to head up the intellectual effort of forming a concept and strategy for an anti-delinquency program. Olin was then at Columbia and he agreed to come to Washington and to begin that work. That became the intellectual underpinning of the President's Committee on Delinquency. The resulting strategy which was community based, was not focused on individual deviancy, and was trying to, through community developmental organization, improve the chances of young people moving in legitimate rather than illegitimate ways basically through the provision of legitimate opportunity, whether it be better schooling or jobs or whatever.

RK: Why was delinquency, I mean I know this is a post-war phenomenon that's really big in the fifties there was a lot of it in film and American culture, gangs, whether it is West Side Story or a lot of instances. Do you have some sense of whether there was so much focus and concern about juvenile delinquents?

DB: That's a good question and I've thought about that a lot.
About every ten years we rediscover delinquency. In part that happens as a result of what happens in the communities. Lincoln Stephens used to say that you could cause a major crime problem by simply beginning to write about it in the media. Whether it is gang activities or whatever it is, the media picks it up and there's heightened interest in it and there is a ripple effect. Young people read about themselves in the newspaper, further act out what the newspapers say that they are doing and then of course the newspapers immediately go to the experts in the field which usually means they go to the universities and ask the professors of the universities to explain what is going on. Then the foundations rediscover delinquency and begin to put money into the field. Basically we go through a process of reinventing the wheel. A lot of money goes down the drain, I'm afraid, reinventing the wheel every so often. At least I think I've seen that over my own career. I think that's basically what happens.

In any case, Olin came to Washington. You have to remember it was a period in which the administration was finding it difficult to get things through the Congress. Congress was not particularly sympathetic to many of the Kennedy initiatives. So it was decided that a lot of the funds for any program should come from existing resources in the federal government. There was created a tri-partite program involving the Labor Department, the Justice Department and then at that time what was know as HEW, Health, Education, and Welfare. And Robert Kennedy became the titular head of that program. Of course his agent
in that regard was David Hackett and David Hackett's agent was Lloyd Olin. So the funds basically for the initial program came from these sources and if I remember correctly, some direct White House allocation of funds. So this was launched. Ultimately the strategy was to develop demonstration programs in a limited number of areas, most of them urban; community based efforts involving both the public sector and the private not-for-profit sector. Most of the organizations that I remember were in fact private, non-profit at the local level but they almost always involved the public sector. This experiment was really getting off the ground, beginning to move. I don't think that the results in any way were in at that point. And then Robert Kennedy was assassinated.

RK: John Kennedy.

DB: I'm sorry, John Kennedy was assassinated which threw everything into turmoil. Johnson came in and decided that there should be a major attack on poverty and there was formed a working group on that, headed up by Sergeant Shriver. In a sense, I became Robert Kennedy's delegate to that relatively small group of people. We began to work on a concept which basically later became the Office of Economic Opportunity Programs involving the community action programs, ultimately Head Start, Upward Bound, the Legal Services Program and the Job Corps and so on. The community action programs of OEO were in fact a direct outgrowth of the work that had been going on in the President's Committee on Delinquency, the demonstration projects in
the cities. Basically the people still in that program wanted to protect what they thought was kind of the integrity of that process. They thought these projects should still remain demonstration projects, that there shouldn't be a large number of new ones until results were clearer about what was happening. But that was not to be. Johnson was a big man. Johnson wanted a big program. Shriver thought grandly so he was in a sense quite supportive of the notion of a much larger program. So ultimately out of this there were launched a whole series of community action programs around the country based upon ultimately a kind of a tri-partite agreement that one, the public sector locally would be involved and two, the private non-profit sector would be involved. Finally people from the neighborhoods, the citizens or representatives of citizens would be involved under maximum feasible participation. That was a new twist because the delinquency program had not called for that level of decision making by representatives of citizens in these areas. As a matter of fact, the whole notion of citizen participation was rather easily accepted. (Interruption)

Neil Boothby: How difficult was it as your meeting with these committees in Washington, trying to put together this concept and the importance and what not, this idea of maximum feasible participation and even community action programs? How was that received and thought about and discussed as part of this overall vision?

DB: Well, it really wasn't discussed that much. It was a pretty
interesting process. I know I was pushing very hard for it. I was pushing on the basis of a series of personal experiences. First being I had run a program in Chicago dealing with street gangs and conventional wisdom among professional circles which suggest that you hire a group of social workers to work with street gangs. Somehow we decided that wasn't going to be appropriate because most social workers we knew basically wanted to be in their offices and interview and talk to clients and counsel them and refer them to some place. And somehow this didn't jive with working with tough street gangs who weren't going to go into anybody's offices. So we junked the idea of hiring professionals and recruited young men who we thought could be tough, relate to and ultimately be respected by these people. And we refused to let them have offices. We gave them station wagons and began to make contact and work with those. It worked. Basically we were gratified that our hunches had paid off. It led me, once again, to feel that in many cases traditional credentials were overrated and that the notion that somehow the professionals had the golden key to the door and could unlock the door and make things right was not correct in many cases.

The other experience was when principally Robert Kennedy suggested that the nation should have what he then called a domestic peace corp. This ultimately came to be in the form of VISTA in the OEO program. But a number of us were recruited to begin to plan it. It turned out that at that point the Congress didn't want it so we
ultimately had to junk it until the so-called war on poverty came along.

But in trying to strategize on this we divided the population of the country up into four categories; urban, rural, Indian, and migrant. I had very limited experience with native Americans. Simply almost by chance I remembered that there was an anthropologist friend of mine, Robert Russell, working on education issues among the Navajos. Bob had married a full blooded Navajo. I began to seek his advice about how to proceed. He was rather graphic and dramatic in saying to me, "Please don't try to do things for these people. Just because you and I are professionals does not entitle us to make assumptions. Try to make contact with these people and listen and see what they think are the major issues confronting them and get their participation in trying to devise solutions." It was great advice. We did listen and as a result of that we were, in a sense, taken into some of the inner circles. It was an important learning experience for me. So I translated, or tried to translate, that learning into the notion that we should not sit in Washington and simply plan out a program for poor people but that we should seek their involvement in any solutions in terms of planning programs at the local level and in being not simply the receivers of services but the providers or part of a system of providing services at the local level.

So I know I pushed for this and others pushed for it as well. After some initial resistance, not very heavy resistance, not even resistance interestingly enough, it seemed to be just a novel idea and
people had to somehow grasp it. They hadn't really thought about it before. So it wasn't real opposition to it. And it became incorporated into the draft legislation. Maximum participation became maximum feasible participation, somewhat of a watering down. I think it was believed this was a political necessity. If I remember correctly the person who is dealing with that politics was Adam Clayton Powell, a brilliant, brilliant man. In any case, the legislation like a lot of the legislation at that point in the new Johnson administration, basically sailed through the Congress. There were some questions about this notion of maximum feasible participation and the big defender of it if I remember correctly was Robert Kennedy. But it basically sailed through and of course ultimately Pat Moynihan decided to write a book trying to trace the history of the community action programs and particularly this concept and as you know it came to be, the book was The Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. But basically sailed through and the rest is history.

RK: Let's back up a little bit. What was it like to go to Washington in the early sixties to work? What was the spirit? What were the kind of expectations? Maybe you can talk a little bit about working with Bobby Kennedy, what differences you saw between him and John and how his vision affected all of that.

DB: Well, of course this was the new frontier. Everything was a bustle. Everything was possible. The image was very masculine and to some degree macho. Sophisticated macho. The notion of wearing
hats, that wasn't appropriate. You could freeze your head but you weren't supposed to wear a hat. You weren't really supposed to wear an overcoat. You were supposed to be out there in the cold with your suit on. That somehow was vigorous. All these little things were happening but there was a great deal of energy and I think creativity. The whole place was permeated with this feeling, mystique about the really important thing was what could you do for your country. People would work late into the night, many hours. Office buildings were lighted up at night which was somewhat novel in Washington at that time. So it was an exciting place. It was an exciting place.

My experiences with Robert Kennedy principally through at that time David Hackett were fascinating. This was the tough guy. This was the guy who would come in and straighten things out. And this was the guy who saw things not in shades or hues but basically in black and white. There were for him the good guys and the bad guys and they were very clear and distinct. I liked him a lot for several reasons. One, I also had the feeling that he wanted to learn. That was in a sense one of Robert Kennedy's saving graces, that he did learn and he did change. That's unique with people with power. But I kept seeing that as he felt things and touched things and had gut reactions. And he had to feel things and he had to touch things and he did have the gut reactions and that was kind of the genesis of the learning process. He did go out on the streets. He did talk to the people. He did feel the pain whether it was in Mississippi when he went down on the hunger
issue, when he went into Harlem and walked the streets of Harlem and talked to young people there. That was a good thing to see because it was unique. People with power tend to become closeted in some way and the learning stops. But it didn't with him.

I remember the first time that I met him. Basically, I was introduced by David Hackett. We were alone in the Attorney General's office and we shook hands with each other. I remember that my father had always taught me when shaking hands, look straight at the other person and as my father used to say, "Never give a fish shake," which is a weak shake. Give a very hard, tough shake and look the other person straight in the eyes. So we greeted each other and I did that. His father must have taught him the same thing because he did exactly the same thing. A tough guy, looked at me straight in the eye and held my hand tightly and we just stood there. It was kind of a war game of sorts and who was going to loosen up first. Then we started laughing because we recognized that we came in that regard in similar paternal traditions. But I liked him a lot. One of the things that I liked about him was when there was a mistake in the department or with someone who was working for him, he always took the blame. Of course the person had some accounting to do behind the scenes, but he was the front person. He was a good person, a good person.

RK: How did John Kennedy's death and the ascendancy of Johnson, did that change the...?

DB: Oh it was devastating to Robert Kennedy. He and Johnson had
really never gotten along. It was just devastating. During that initial period after the assassination it was I'm sure very, very uncomfortable for both of them. But that, in many ways, didn't affect us. I'm not sure why but it really didn't affect us. I think Shriver had Johnson's confidence and notwithstanding the fact that he was part of the Kennedy family. And that was a bridging mechanism for many of us. We just went ahead.

RK: What about Shriver? Did you find him a...

DB: Shriver was fascinating, a real can do person, dynamic, thoughtful, funny, very, very hard working. I liked him a lot. His notion of chain of command was fairly interesting because there was Shriver and then everybody else. (Laughter) He really didn't go for a long chain of command. He wanted to reach out and be able to get each of us if epitomized by a huge telephone console with many, many buttons on your office desk so he could directly reach about twenty-five people. That's the way he operated. And he was very open to innovation and creativity. He was not enamored of the concept of community action, however. The notion of trying to, at the local level, coordinate a variety of interests worried him I think mainly because as he said of his experience in Chicago of both him and his wife, Eunice, in relation to the school board there and public education and the complexity of trying to pull various parts together and keep them together. Both in terms of the complexity of the process and the complexity of explaining the process to others. Shriver was
very sensitive to the Hill, to the Congress and the notion of trying to explain what a community action program and all of its intricacies to a Congress person was a daunting task. So he was not enamored of the concept.

NB: From the beginning he was not enamored?

DB: No, no from the beginning he wasn't enamored. To him a Job Corps made sense, kind of a single purpose program. To him Head Start made sense. You could explain it. It had a kind of, as he perceived, it a single purpose, not a complex interrelated series of purposes and it could be easily explained. So he was drawn toward first actually the Job Corps. He was much more drawn to the Job Corp than to developing community action programs. So he was open to those kinds of single purpose programs. I don't know how he and Sister Jacqueline from St. Louis, I believe, came together but she was the one who suggested the concept of Head Start. I think subsequently a number of people have taken ownership but they are poachers. Sister Jacqueline was the key to it. And he liked the idea and asked several of us on the senior staff to meet with him and talk about it and we liked the idea. And he said "Well, let's get other opinions," but his disposition was to begin to move with it. My traditional concern with professionals was once again heightened when we called together a group of early childhood specialists, most of them from academia to discuss the idea. Not all were early childhood specialists but most of them were. As I remember that meeting almost all of them opposed the idea.
of Head Start. For some reason I didn't find that shocking because of my own work and experiences but I think others did. Somehow they felt that we didn't know enough to launch such a massive national program. Somehow it would upset a process in which they were engaged in trying to further develop both the theory and practice of child development. And finally it wasn't theirs. The only person in the room I remember coming out boldly for the idea was a gentleman by the name of Silver, John Silver, who at that time I think was at the University of Texas. I'm not sure how he and Shriver had known each other but he was in the room basically because of that relationship I think. He thought it was a great idea.

So the meeting was over and we went back and we decided not to take seriously the opposition and to get things started and so we brought in a young man by the name of Jules Sugarman to become the kind of administrative director. Very experienced in making things go in Washington and moving through rules, regulations and bureaucracies to get things done. He was very, very good. There was ultimately appointed as kind of the head of it all because of his credentials a professor from Harvard. What was his name? Dr. Richmond. You know with the appropriate credentials to protect us in that regard from the other childcare people who were not particularly happy, childcare professionals who were not particularly happy. So the program was started. Well, from Shriver's point of view, it was successful in two respects. It was single purpose, understandable, needed. And it was
a buffer, in dealing with Congress particularly, to the community action programs which were inevitably slow in getting off the ground, difficult to explain and in many respects the results wouldn't be in for some time. So things like the Job Corp and Head Start and other programs became the lead programs in explaining to Congress what OEO was doing. Similarly the Foster Grandparents Program was the same thing, the same so-called single purpose program, easily explained. That again was a fascinating experience.

End of Tape 1 - Side A
Tape 1 - Side B

DB: ... in this society who basically had no function and were becoming vegetables. Many of them lonely in rooms but still physically and mentally able people. On the other hand we would see going into the infant's ward in public hospitals row after row of babies with no place to go. Cribs lined up against each other. Why not bring these two needy populations together so at least these elderly people could pick these babies up and hold them and rock them and be motherly toward them at a point in life where that was crucial for children. So I took the idea to Shriver and Shriver said, "I really like it," and he asked me to come to his house to meet with a Dr. Cook who was close to the Shriver family. If I remember correctly he was a researcher into mental retardation. And Cook thought the idea was great. Shriver discussed it if I remember correctly with Hubert Humphrey and Hubert Humphrey thought it was great. One reason he
thought it was great is that he thought that OEO was moving much too far in the direction of simply children. One of Humphrey's major constituencies was the elderly so the notion of bringing these two populations together in a functional and supportive way was seen as politically desirable. So we sent field people out to various places to kind of test the concept on people who might be called upon to use the program. One of these people went to, if I remember correctly, the Cook County Hospital in Chicago where they had a huge ward of babies waiting to go nowhere and discussed the program with the head nurse, bringing in elderly people and doing a variety of things but making human touching contact with these babies. She basically threw up her arms and said, "Oh no, we don't want that. Who would supervise them?" When I heard about that I said oh, my God - one more case of a professional somehow denying desperately needed service because the helpers did not have the appropriate credentials to offer service. So of course we ignored her. We discussed the program with Powell, Adam Clayton Powell, and he loved it. Shriver discussed the program with the President. Johnson loved it and decided it was so good that he would announce it personally on a Sunday from the White House. That's exactly what he did. And the foster grandparent program was launched one more, I think important program at the time, but also a buffer program so that there wouldn't be such a focus on what is this thing called community action and why does it take so long to get started and what's really going to come out of it? That sort of things.
RK: Maybe you could talk a little bit about the opposition that begins to form around these community action programs. What is it that particular groups, you talked a little bit about professionals, but what is it about other groups, what do they find threatening about the prospect of coordinating...?

DB: Well, several things. Coordination is difficult. It is very difficult and you have to have on the one hand the power of persuasion with all its complexity and drama and on the other hand you have to have power, simply power. In this case the power was money to attract the various parties to the table. But coordination is difficult, complex. Things can break down. Competitiveness can rise up and things don't get done quickly. It's a slow building process and people can become irritated or the various interests can become irritated. The mayor's office can say, "Why don't things move more rapidly? If this were our program, we would be way ahead." And private non-for-profit organizations are basically jockeying because there's always the competition for scarce resources. Then there was this other feature of the program that somehow representatives from populations to be affected had to participate at two levels. The first level is in relation to planning and policy and the second level is the actual provision of services, notwithstanding the fact that they might not have the appropriate credentials to offer those services. So we are talking about a very complex new sort of thing. So two major irritants were there. The first irritant was the complexity of the...
process generally and the second irritant was with who are these new people? Who are these people we haven't really dealt with before, these people from the so-called street who are not part of our fraternity, who have not played by those rules of the game? What right do they have to be here? We will offer them services but what right do they have to try to influence policy? Some of these citizen representatives were in fact major irritants. Actually two things happened. First of all, some of them were boisterous, demanding, tough. So you had that. And then others were the opposite. They were easily co-opted because they had not had the experience of dealing at this level and were easily co-opted. So it was a very complex, difficult undertaking. I think if there we a principal weakness in their participation, it was that we had not spent enough time thinking through what we meant by legitimate representatives of these people. That is to say, what does this mean to be a representative of and how did these people emerge as legitimate representatives of other citizens? That was a very difficult thing. I had a great deal of respect for Saul Linsky and the process by which citizen based organizations emerged through the industrial areas' foundation programs which he ran. And I felt that was a legitimate way of both identifying community priorities, developing a power base for trying to find answers to those and securing a legitimate leadership among citizens. But there were very few programs like that in the country and there were many, many community action programs. And so
ultimately the community action staff decided that the way to deal with this was local elections. I think the local elections proved to be only marginally successful in really legitimizing leadership. Many of the elections were poorly attended and the key here is that those who were elected did not, in fact, have organized constituencies. They did not, in fact, have an organized power base. So when they came to the table they really didn't have what I would call the power of community. That was another complexity.

RK: Was there a particular CAP program that exemplified some of these problems that you remember?

DB: Well, yes but you have to remember when you ask that question that I was not the director of community action programs. Fred Hayes had that task. I was frankly much more interested in the development of special demonstration programs whether they be Head Start or Upward Bound or the Legal Services Program or the Foster Grandparents Program. What I was interested in and kept pushing for during the time I was in OEO was the implementation at all levels, this maximum feasible participation concept, both in terms of involvement of citizens in policy and planning and in the provision of services. One of the things that my staff pushed hard for was building in to community action programs the budget for what was then called nonprofessionals to work in these programs. One of the big areas was in the provision of health services, ultimately the nonprofessional hospital workers. This ultimately became a major union. (Laughter) So in some ways I am not
the right person to ask. Chicago had its experiences and problems. New York had the same thing. Newark I think worked relatively well but it varied dramatically.

RK: You were in one of the more exciting positions then because you worked in creating and developing and planning all these new initiatives. What about legal aid? Legal aid as an issue that became really, became very problematic I think. It was one of the things that Reagan went after.

DB: The Legal Services Program was the brainchild basically of Edgar and Jean Kahn, both of whom were lawyers, brilliant people, brilliant people. I think if I remember correctly the Kahns had met when both of them were students at Yale. This was an interracial marriage. They became deeply concerned about the problems of poor people in New Haven. Out of that experience and out of their legal training they decided that one of the key things that poor people needed was adequate legal representation. And of course they were absolutely right. I don't remember exactly how Edgar came to OEO but he was known in Washington through an internship at the Justice Department while he was still a student at Yale. Edgar's father, I think Edmond Kahn, was an academic and a brilliant man behind the scenes and for years was a private advisor to several of the Supreme Court justices. He was well known as an original thinker and a deep thinker. Edgar was part of that tradition. In any case, Jean and Edgar with a lot of input from Jean put together this concept and basically sold it to Shriver.
That was the genesis of the Legal Services Program which was an extremely important program and a program which eventually under the Reagan administration was seen as a serious threat to the status quo. As you know, there were many, many attempts to kill the program. But Jean and Edgar had done a really good job in trying to gain, in this case, a professional constituency in support of it including the American Bar Association. And that constituency plus the fact that many people on the Hill, many of our Congress people were lawyers, there was a certain sensitivity to the notion that this was somehow important and legitimate. And though the Reagan administration and the Bush administration constantly attempted to dismantle the program, it survived. My assumption is that with the Clinton administration and the fact that Hillary Clinton served on the board of National Legal Services that it will see a renaissance which will be very exciting. It will be very exciting.

RK: It's interesting in the south how the legal service lawyers, how critical they have been on a whole range of issues, on voting rights, health care and education, migrants.

DB: It is extremely important both in individual services and in policy. As a matter of fact, I think many of us should have legal service access since lawyers are becoming so expensive. I mean most people can't afford lawyers. They just can't. It's not just the poor. They can't afford lawyers. The American Bar has not faced up to that.
NB: You mentioned earlier that as these programs were unfolding one of the things you were concerned with was examining the role and concept of maximum feasible participation. You mentioned that one of the things you did was you looked at budgetary things and the category of nonprofessionals. Were there other things that you were concerned with or able to do in terms of how it actually gets implemented from a Washington ( ) perspective?

DB: I think that the key attempts were one, to be sure that there was structural room for citizens to participate in the policy development and the planning development and that they sat on the board. In terms of the provision of services and being hired to provide services as you say the key was the discreet budget for those purposes. Every community action program had to have that part and there were budgets for that part. There was a sharing of experience as these programs unfolded, what worked and what didn't work and there were staffs both in the field and in Washington which were trying to transfer knowledge as these programs developed. But beyond that I don't think that there was, I think that was the mold so to speak.

NB: Was there any formula in terms of the budget for the nonprofessionals that you think in terms of percentages?

DB: Yes I think that there were but I've forgotten exactly what those percentages were. It was quite substantial in some cases. It was a jobs program.

NB: Well, this was one of the big criticisms of outsiders, the
CDGM for example. They said, if you read these memos that are going from the field back to OEO essentially some of the arguments were they are not really working with children. They are just employing the poor in some ways, these nonprofessionals.

DB: You mean in the Head Start programs?
NB: Yeah.

DB: I think that's totally incorrect. As a matter of fact, each Head Start program in order to get X amount of dollars had to involve substantial numbers of kids. The fact that they involved citizen adults from the area to us was very legitimate because it helped to reinforce the legitimacy of the program in the community. Now in some cases there is no question that the program was utilized not only as a service to children but as a community organizing device. In almost all cases, however, to get additional complementary services for the kids. So I wouldn't agree with those who claim that there was some sort of diversion of funds away from kids for an adult jobs program. I never felt it.

NB: I think in our examination we haven't found that either but that it was a brilliant creative thing to bring these people in. But I am wondering, for example, back on the Hill if it was envisioned in a single purpose modality and in fact it's functioning in multiple purposes. It is using kids to organize...

DB: That concern didn't really exist on the Hill except in one major case which was the child development group of Mississippi. As
a matter of fact, I don't think we really felt major pressures from professionals who ordinarily would have said, "These people are not skilled enough to work with children. They haven't had the training to work with children." But surprisingly, even that kind of criticism really didn't materialize. Now the fact that it didn't was in part due to the skill of Julius Richmond who was from Harvard, was an expert in the field of child health, had the appropriate credentials and could talk the shorthand of that professional world. His role was very important.

RK: Maybe you could talk a little bit about leaving OEO and some of maybe the frustrations or the problems there.

DB: I wasn't really frustrated in leaving OEO. Walter Ruther who was co-chair of the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty and Eugene Carson Blake who was probably the principal person in the U.S. Presbyterian Church basically had conceived of a program outside of government which would try to advance many of the ideas which in fact were embodied in OEO. I was recruited to head it up. I had reached the conclusion that at this stage that it would in fact be important to have an organization outside of government which would both watchdog and press for further implementation of programs, not just in OEO but in other parts of government in support of work on poverty issues. So it was on that basis that I agreed to go over. And it was fun. It was fun. While it lasted it was fun. Ultimately it became less and less feasible for such a coalition as had been formed to survive mainly
because more and more tensions between on the one hand we become the Stokely Carmichael wrap-around part of the movement and one, other blacks into that part of the movement and white leadership. And this had been formed as a kind of coalition so it became less and less feasible. Ultimately we felt it important to put it to bed because we didn't think at that point that it could perform what it had been to created to perform. But that was later on. The two big things that the crusade was involved in was one, the Washington representatives of the child development group in Mississippi when it came under attack by Stennis and Eastland and really probably Johnson and strangely enough a Democratic study group. We became the agents of that group in Washington. And that was a very important battle. Again, our work was facilitated by Bob Kennedy who somewhat behind the scenes got into it and proved to be very helpful. The other major effort of the crusade during it's relatively short life was dealing with hunger in America. That was a fascinating experience because we, in fact, wanted some kind of campaign focus, strategic focus.

I don't remember the exact circumstances but Marion Wright ( ), at that time Marion Wright, was working for the Legal Defense Fund in Mississippi and she came up and we had a meeting. I don't know how Marion and I came to know each other but very impressive woman, deeply committed to social justice. She was very, very tired. Very tired. I almost thought we were going to have to prop her up in the meeting because she hadn't had much sleep. But she was the one who first said
you know, we may be able to do a lot of things but one of the things we have to do is to deal with hunger because it is so pervasive. It is affecting not only adults but desperately affecting children. And so we took that suggestion seriously, began to look at the problem more seriously and of course, and basically found that she was right. But unfortunately, much of it was hidden, a hidden problem. And interestingly enough, we scheduled a meeting with the Secretary of Agriculture to discuss it with the Secretary. Jack Conway was involved in that. And we went over to talk to him about the crusade and wanting his support in dealing with hunger. At that time there was a commodities program but no food stamp program. Commodities distribution was uneven in every sense of the word. So we talked to him about it and the Secretary ultimately said, "I want you to know that I'm very sympathetic to this but I also want you to know that I don't run the Department of Agriculture." This was the Secretary of Agriculture. So we were a little bit aghast. We said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Well Jamie Wooden runs this program." He was basically saying, "I'm sympathetic but my guess is that Jamie Wooden would not be sympathetic and so I don't think I can help you very much." Well, with that we went off and created a national board of inquiry into hunger and malnutrition in the country, supported in large part initially by the Field Foundation which had put doctors in the field which I think was a brilliant stroke and the then director of the Field Foundation, Leslie Dunbar was extremely helpful in that regard. The
Field Foundation stayed with it which is noteworthy. So there was this inquiry and a lot of work went into it. People were fanned out all across the country. And, as strange as it might seem, there was big opposition to this work led by members of the House Agriculture Appropriations Committee who had a friend in J. Edgar Hoover. Those of us who were claiming there were problems of hunger in the United States were viewed as subversive. We didn't know it at the time but shortly thereafter we found out that a Secretary of Agriculture had allowed a blind office to be set up in the Department of Agriculture, staffed by FBI. FBI then fanned out to investigate all of us. My first experience with that was it was on a weekend and my family was living in American University Park which was a desirable location for members of the diplomatic community and across from me was living, I think, the second Secretary of the British Embassy, some high official, very nice guy. I think I was walking my dog on Saturday morning and he stopped me and said he'd like to have a cup of tea with me, spot of tea, later that morning. Would I join him? I said sure. I didn't know what this was all about. So I went over and we sat down and he said, "I just want you to know that I was very upset about something and I simply wanted to let you know and discuss it with you." I said, "What was that?" He said well, "I happened to be not at home and my wife wasn't home but we have two sons who are home from school from England. They were here and two men came up and really began to try to interrogate them about you and your family and I subsequently
discovered that they were your people. I found that very upsetting. I don't like it and I wanted to be sure that you were apprised of it." But I'm afraid that happened to a number of people and in addition to that we heard that FBI agents were in the field and were beginning to interview some of the people we were working with in the field. Of course, that in itself was intimidating. So we recruited a gentleman by the name of Harry Boyt, a young lawyer in Washington to develop a counter offensive. And the counter offensive was basically very simple which was to apprise people in the field that this might happen, that in no way to be afraid of it but to simply insist that if the agent came in that there be a recording of the conversation. This subsequently scared them off I guess. I don't know what happened but we never really took it seriously after that. But it was a sign of the times and a sign of the both direct and covert opposition to looking into this matter. So the inquiry went on and finally a report was issued called "Hunger in America." None of us, none of us could have predicted the impact. It was on the front page of every leading American newspaper. We couldn't have predicted that. We received calls from Germany and England and France. How could there be hunger in America? So it became a big thing. To make a long story short, out of that disclosure plus the other things that were happening including Murrells' program on "Harvest of Shame" I think it was called, had enormous impact, the march on Washington, poor people, all of that kind of came together in a way which awakened American people
to the problem and forced political action. At that point we were very fortunate because we had friends in the Senate who really took the lead. Javitts, Clark from Pennsylvania, Robert Kennedy, who were enormously helpful in keeping this focused and enormously helpful in pushing through legislation. Ultimately it was interesting because the legislation in some ways was very bi-partisan. Bob Dole liked it a lot. Did a lot for farmers. Basically, this went through in the Nixon administration. We could see the fruits of that effort and if the crusade had not served any other purpose having served that would have made it worthwhile.

RK: This coalition of people, it was quite an interesting mix. How did you find that? The different kinds - labor people, civil rights activists...

DB: The formation of that had begun before I even came into the program. The program hadn't really begun. The notion of the coalition of labor civil rights, religious groups, and some service organizations, that concept had been developed before I came in. My job was to basically take that coalition and help to give it a program. But it was interracial and with people coming from various walks of life. It was probably at that point the last major vestiges of an interracial common ground organization focused on social justice.

RK: It seems to me that it represents kind of the highlight of that, not highlight, but the kind of key point in some ways of those efforts.
DB: Yes, things began to change rather dramatically. The whole black power movement was an agent of that change. I was basically personally quite sympathetic to much of the black power movement which suggested the importance of a particular kind of integrity and development among blacks. Not so much the separatists' identity but the notion that we are somebody and it's important for us to move.

RK: What role did the crusade play with the CDGM thing?

DB: Part of the role that we ultimately played I think was in part related to the role that I had previously played in OEO in helping a group of us to steer resources and to help really create this program so when I moved over it wasn't as if the program were new to me. I became obviously very concerned about the crisis as did many other people. We were asked by the leadership of CDGM to kind of help them from a Washington base in this crisis. And we immediately agreed to try to play that role. Basically a team of us in the crusade worked very closely with them through that battle including the development of Washington based strategy. People from Mississippi coming up and really lobbying their cause in the Congress with Shriver and even trying to deal with the White House directly. And we had so many forces aligned against us, powerful forces, that we were constantly hearing, you know, don't try it, you're not going to win, know when you are outgunned. But there was a certain tenacity driven basically by the deep beliefs and the tenacity of the people in Mississippi so we stuck with it and may have been saved by a guy by the name of Nicholas
VonHoffman. We tried very hard to get national publicity for this and the New York Times wouldn't touch it. I still don't know why the Times wouldn't touch it. I can't believe it was cowardice. Somebody got to somebody at the Times and they really wouldn't cover it. At that time Nicholas VonHoffman who (           ) always said was the best organizer he had ever trained ......

End of Tape 1 - Side B

Tape 2 - Side A

DB: ...and he began to cover the story. And it became front page news in the Washington Post. He kept it alive. Nick VonHoffman kept this thing alive. And of course, everybody on the Hill reads the Washington Post. So he was one of the saviors, as it turned out, by keeping everything going. And we finally began to gather steam and some say the high point of the battle was the big ad in the New York Times which basically the Presbyterians paid for. We got the firm that handled Robert Kennedy's media during his senatorial campaign to kind of dream up the ad. It was a brilliant, brilliant ad that they dreamed up entitled "Say It Isn't So Searg," which was to say, Searg, you're really a good person. Please tell us. Wasn't that really a blast to Searg? Signed by about a hundred people, relatively prominent people which I guess just really infuriated Searg, I'm sorry to say. But it became obvious that we weren't going away, that the people in CDGM weren't going away, that this was embarrassing the administration,
that a viable coalition of religious leaders, labor leaders and civil rights activists were hanging together on this thing. Ultimately that power plus help behind the scenes from people on the Hill, including once again Robert Kennedy, resulted in OEO saying, "Okay, let's make a deal." So ultimately a deal was formulated and not certainly all to the advantage of CDGM. But it kept the program on. And Nick Lehman in his book on Promised Land, of course, details this and basically says, if I remember correctly, the program ultimately was a failure. That the counter program lives in Mississippi and this program doesn't. In that regard, I have a lot of respect for Lehman because I think he got a lot of things right. He got more things right than most current journalist historians. But I think he was wrong about that, not so much because, well let's restate it. I think he was wrong about that because I don't think he traced the ripple effect of the program in terms of the integrity that it helped people to have, black people; in terms of the pride that it offered; in terms of the enormous training in leadership that it was responsible for which can be seen today in elected officials and in other people. He didn't somehow trace what I would call that heritage. And that was the great value for me of the program. Yes, of course I'm sorry that it didn't survive the way it had been constructed but it was an enormously valuable program and a program I think which all the people involved can be proud of.

RK: You spoke about the determination and the dignity of these people in Mississippi. Two questions, what was your feeling when you
went down to work with them coming out of a policy (    ) in Washington? And what impressed you about them? What kind of feelings did you have? We want to ultimately trace some of these people a little bit more. We were talking to Unita Blackwell a few weeks ago and some others. You might just reminisce a little bit about some of the people you came in contact with.

DB: Well, not so much that. I don't really remember too much about that. But fortunately for me, given what I have already told you, I had I think disciplined myself in going into situations like that to ask questions and listen because I did respect the citizen. And that was fortunate. I didn't go in with a hammer. I gained a lot of respect for these people by listening to them and finding how excited they were about the potential of this program. At that particular time, strange as it may seem, the director of the program was white, John Mudd, a wonderful person. He really helped to mold the program. My guess is that once it had been molded if there suddenly an election for a director there would have been a black director. But he was there kind of at the beginning and John also knew when to leave. But at the height of the battle of CDGM there was a mass kind of state wide rally at Jackson State University. I was there. Nick VonHoffman was there and aroused black leadership was there from all of the Head Start programs. It was a massive, very important event both in the coming together and kind of coming together we shall overcome this. I'll never forget this coming together in such a large way. Also for some,
kind of crystallized the fact that this was basically a black program but there was a white leader, John Mudd, running the program. Very responsive in running the program to the black leadership within it. There was this concern in the audience about this and I'll never forget Fannie Lou Hamer was a key to that rally conference. Great woman and also a great singer. And in one fell swoop she dealt with this problem. She was on stage and people had enormous respect for her and she sang and led the audience in a song and then sudden said, "John Mudd," who was the director, "you come up here on this stage," in a very commanding voice. John of course didn't know what was going to happen next. John came up and Fannie Lou Hamer put her arms around him and said very loudly, "We love you John." That was the end of that problem. A brilliant political act. (Laughter)

RK: She was a very smart woman.

DB: At the time. But those were great days and I constantly remember that it really would have been much, much more difficult had it not been for VonHoffman who followed this every day and really kept it in many respects on the front burner, the Washington Post.

RK: In moving to the Citizens Crusade and being involved in this controversy, how did your relationship, you'd been in the White House or working around the executive branch, did you in your kind of moving away from that world although, not entirely, how did you start seeing your role as a political person or a citizen involved in these kinds of issues? Did that change your effectiveness and were you concerned
about that at the time?

DB: I don't really think I was concerned about it. I became an outside person having been an inside person but that was very common with people who had been associated with the Kennedys because Johnson had no love for that particular group. So it really wasn't traumatic and I felt then and I feel today that even when you have friends in government and maybe particularly when you have friends in government it's important to create outside power to keep those things that you're most concerned about front and center. There's the myth that if your party's in power you can sit back, particularly if you are a social activist. It is in fact a myth. At the point that your party is in power is the very point where it's most important to have an outside force with a constituency base to be to the left of those who are in power because they are inevitably going to be pulled in the other direction. So it becomes an extremely important point to have that kind of counterbalance. Probably more important in many regards than when your party is not in power because the potential of doing something creative is definitely there. You have to protect that potential.

RK: Richard Cloward who'd been an important influence on you and the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency about this same time comes much more involved as an activist or at least a theorist for activists. He was very influential in helping form the National Worker Rights Organization. What do you think about that development? What kind of role did it play in putting pressure on the government?
some interaction?

DB: Cloward was a major theoretician of anti-poverty efforts and ultimately Cloward and now his wife, Fran Pivan, became a team to that end. Very, very creative valuable team people. I think that the welfare rights movement, the concept behind it was very important. As more recently, Cloward's leadership on voter registration, education and get out the vote efforts and the proposed legislation which will finally probably be passed on voter registration. All of that, a lot of it is traceable to Dick and Pivan. I think that the movement was important. I think it had many problems. It did not have the advantage of a major coalitional base but on the other hand I think it's made a difference. Again, it turned out to be a major training ground particularly for black women, major training ground. In some respects, I think I have my facts right, some of the people who are involved in that were also some of the people who became involved in such things as ACORN and other organizations which are quite prominent today. I think that people like Cloward are very valuable.

RK: We were amazed to find a strong welfare rights organization in eastern Kentucky and the influence the interracial dimension of that national organization which I didn't really realize but also the influences that the civil rights movement had had on those people and how those two and anti-poverty efforts fit together in different ways.

DB: Oh yeah. And the people involved went on. One person just comes to mind immediately, a person named Andrea Kitt, a black woman
who was really trained in the welfare rights movement. She went on to become one of the key deputies in VISTA. Went on to become a director of the youth project in Washington and is now a valued staff member of the Cummings Foundation. Her assignment is principally health. You could see the progression of this woman based upon first of all, of course, her own basic abilities but this honing and training through such things as the welfare rights movement.

RK: With Nixon's election and the kind of break up of the movement, how did you... And then I guess the Citizens Crusade, you fold that in about the same time.

DB: We folded it into the Center on Community Change. I became a vice president I guess of the Center on Community Change and again I was primarily focusing on innovative demonstration programs. It was through there that we created the Youth Project among other things. Then I left there to head up the Robert Kennedy Memorial. Again we focused on young people. That was fun. I had a good time, good time there. Ultimately I went to California and in the long term I headed up, first of all on an interim basis and then as permanent director of the Field Foundation.

RK: In the wake of the aftermath of the sixties, what were the... were there new directions that people in situations and organizations that you were moving in or trying to move things, is there a fairly good bit of continuity? The federal money at least was harder to get for a lot of things. Did foundations step down?
DB: No, I think there was not continuity. There was major disjuncture. That is to say, and that disjuncture was occasioned mainly by Watergate and Vietnam. We talk about social activists and so on and there was, of course, an enormous drop in faith in government as a result of both Watergate and Vietnam and what government could and would do. It was at that point I think, that period, that the sense developed among many of us, that government was becoming an enemy of the people. That was novel for us. There were truly believers in that category coming out of SDS and the Vietnam confrontation and as a result after the massive efforts to stop government oppression, particularly in relation to the Vietnam situation, there was a residue of very hard and bad feelings about both the misuse of power in government which we then called lawlessness in government and more and more a tendency to believe that a lot of government was corrupt. So out of that milieu came the feeling on the part of many activists that they should turn away from big government and organize at the grass roots and let a thousand flowers bloom which in some respects I view as a tragedy because there was really a turning away from dealing with extremely important power. So you had a series of grass roots efforts all over the country, a hatred of Washington and all that it stood for and this focus, classic example was the peace movement, ( ) was a good example. Big, big focus on grass roots organizing. No focus on being a power broker in Washington. And the fact of the matter is, the Congress never took ( ) seriously. And then the rhetoric, the
descriptive rhetoric of the situation developed now generally known as the dichotomy of inside the beltway and outside the beltway. This has been the crystallization of the crisis so to speak. And it really is a tragedy because while there has been a significant growth in grassroots organizing around the country, basically the power inherent in that has not been brought together into a critical mass in order either to affect state power or federal power. I think the potential is there but there's been a great resistance to using hard won power from the local level in any coalescing and any vision literally to try to affect either the state or federal government. There are some exceptions to this but unfortunately I think we are still at that level. It hurts both sides. It hurts the grassroots people because they're not using their power fully and it hurts their friends in Washington and they do have friends in Washington who, when they work with the White House or against the White House, with the Hill and for and against people on the Hill, of course the first question asked is what power do you bring in support of your position. Unfortunately for the most part, these organizations cannot call upon a coalition of grassroots power and that is a serious, pervasive problem.

NB: We've got about fifteen minutes or so and then we are going to try to honor out commitment to get you back at the hotel by the time you need to get back. I'm just curious if you might reflect a bit about, based on your experience and your insights, what you might some of this stuff that Clinton is proposing which is fairly modest. He's
talking about, for example, one of the things is kind of reforming the welfare system and making work pay again. Is that going to work as he is going about it?

DB: Well, I think that the first and most important thing to remember is that I don't think any of the candidates really spoke to the question of poverty and they certainly didn't speak to the growing plight of the cities. I think if I remember correctly Clinton made one speech in Los Angeles on poverty. This is simply reflective. Well, it's reflective of several things, but the first thing it is reflective of is that poor people don't vote or they vote in lesser percentages than other people. That's the first thing to remember and it goes back once again to the question where is the power? The second thing which was very important was that as this election materialized, there was a growing concern within the middle classes about their plight of being squeezed and these people vote and they vote very heavily. And so there tended to be a gravitation towards a concern principally for that population. That means that poor people were not perceived as a major factor in the election. I think what we'll see is that they will not be a front and center concern in this administration. The second thing of course is that we are in difficult economic straits so when the pie is large you can cut a variety of slices and everybody gets a bite. But when the pie is small you have a competition for resources. And the pie is small. We have an enormous deficit problem which must be addressed. We have an enormous jobs
program which has been given great visibility not because of the poor but because of the new victims which are in many cases from the middle class. It's a white collar unemployment problem. So when Clinton talks about putting people back to work, politically I think he's most concerned about putting the new unemployed back to work. I am not suggesting in any way he's not concerned but there has to be a political agenda.

NB: The thing that was curious to me is that one of his advisers said something to the effect that all changes when it comes to helping people out of poverty come from these broad based consensus things which is what they are pursuing. In the same breath he was sort of advising Clinton's administration to avoid the war on poverty. I think he called it the oratory that infused hope in the most downtrodden Americans. Is that true? Whatever modest successes have happened, has it come through broad based consensus or has it come through shaking the system up?

DB: See I don't know whether it comes through broad based consensus but I think it has tended to come through broadly based programs. There is a current controversy about this among analysts on whether you want to push for broad based programs which at the same time they help the poor, help others so that you do have a larger political constituency for the efforts. The classic, of course, is social security. Of course, social security unfortunately doesn't help a lot of poor people. But through it's various manifestations
it is helpful and in a sense it has become sacrosanct because of its wide base, its universality. Interestingly enough, because so many people currently use it that didn't think they would ever use it, the food stamp program has a larger political support base. So there is that mentality that you have to have that bigger circle in order to protect the services to a target population. And then there is the earmarked programs, the other side of the story, the targeted programs. I think some of those programs have been relatively successful. Generally however, they reach ultimately several levels up from what they were intended to reach. So I don't have a clear answer to that around consensus. All I'm saying is it's not so much the notion of broad based consensus politically as to who are the targets for the program and how big that particular circle is. On the other hand, you could take exception to that and say what about the enormous growth of programs for the physically impaired? Special class, they have been enormously successful at getting things. So you have to take each program almost and look at it and say why. I don't think that there is a universal answer to this. I just don't think that that exists. A lot of politics is not based upon universality. It is based upon rewarding those who are with you and not rewarding others. So a lot of what comes about is going to be results of special interests, one form of special interest or another.

NB: Yesterday you were talking, sort of calling various parts of the United States that are sort of these concentrated long term (
you referred to them as reservations, kind of both that image and (        ) or what not. What are some of the elements that would have to be brought together say in the Appalachian Mountains to move that, make it a non-reservation or give people the equipment to get out of those things?

DB: Well, I think that the term reservation is apt and I don't mean in any way to insult native Americans but if you look at the continuing plight of native Americans on reservations then you see the depth of a certain kind of problem facing a fairly stationery population. So the notion of reservation is written large. You take the Cumberland plateau in the eastern Kentucky area, you know, what to do? Various things have been tried. It is a classic case in many respects where forms of localism become the enemy. Where in a sense hereditary power thrives on the maintenance of dependency and poverty. Where kin patterns may define who is the county judge, who is the county superintendent of schools and who is the sheriff. I remember in a number of cases through work in OEO that when the suggestion was made to bring, say, new industry into a popular that there was often opposition on the part of political leadership because it would upset the status quo. Not enough attention is given to the problems of localism. There is kind of a glorification of grass roots and localism and so on but a lot of it is empty rhetoric. The question is how do you analyze the positives and negatives of that? In terms of the situation that pervasive poverty continues to exist in the area, it
has many roots. I don't think I'm qualified to sit here and to analyze all of them, including cases of absentee ownership of the land and the problems of the tax base and all the rest. But if I were asked what kinds of programs would you try to invoke in the area, without trying to be specific and to suggest that a particular program has a universal value in all areas, I would simply say at this stage given our situation nationally and internationally, two single programs that are most important are programs dealing with health and dealing with education. To somehow focus on how to keep people well in order not to become diseased and starting with children. Second of all dramatic upgrading in the quality of education. Why do I say that? Because unless today a person is healthy and relatively well educated, the options for that person are so severely limited that inevitably a person is moving toward a form of dependency. If a person is well educated and in good health that person is not tied to locality and can pursue options elsewhere.... Given the world's economic situation and the emerging economic pacts, not only will there be a freerer flow of capital there will be I think a constant movement of populations. Hopefully as people try to better their circumstances, and I am not opposed to that kind of mobility, I would hope that those kinds of programs would increase the ability of people towards effective self determination. Not only that but if you look at the kinds of health programs that would be needed and the kinds of education programs that would be needed, we would begin grade schools through colleges and universities and
special apprenticeship programs. Both are labor intensive. Not only at their core are they labor intensive, but they breed a whole set of support industries for which people should be trained from those areas. That is so much better than trying to attract a products industry such as textiles or at one time they were trying to attract a shoe industry from the northeast or for that matter most other industries. It is so much better. It would inevitably upset the status quo of the area which is extremely important to do if you want to break stranglehold that political fiefdoms have in the perpetuation of poverty.

NB: National Community Service Corps.

RK: You want to pass on that one?

DB: No I'll just say a few things about it. The rhetoric sounds good. I don't hear much about specificity. I don't hear much about the problems of bureaucracy as they emerge from such a massive program if it is to be a massive program. I'm certainly at this stage not opposed to it but I have many questions about it. I'm primarily interested in two things in relation to or in junction with this. One is meaningful and productive work and the other is entitlement to education. Now if a National Service Corps can somehow facilitate those two things, then I think it is valuable. On the other hand, it's not easy. One might find that many unions would be opposed to certain forms of meaningful work on the part of National Service Corps members and a number of voluntary agencies would love to use National Service Corps people but not for very meaningful tasks. So that is very
important, whether or not there can be meaningful tasks which where not only important things get done but important things get learned by the Corps people. The other is the question to how that relates to entitlement to education. If a service period in fact entitles a person to quality education, it could be worth it. I would simply like to see all young people entitled to quality education including higher education because I think the payoff ultimately is enormous in terms of even tax dollars. Not in the short term but in the long term. Of course there can be gradations of aid. I'm not suggesting that all young people be helped alike but I do think there should be a basic entitlement and that the enormous value of that is obvious. It is obvious from the G.I. bill. That's where we have to go because we are moving more and more toward a so-called knowledge society. Unless people have the knowledge and have certain kinds of basic abilities which facilitate change, adaptation, adjustment, ingenuity, entrepreneurship, whatever else, they are doomed. They are doomed. I would like to see free choice, that young people are not relegated to certain educational enterprises but have those choices so that there is a competitiveness in that process. If the National Service Corps can somehow facilitate either one or both of those, then I'm all for it. But I am not for it if it becomes make work or work that in a sense other people don't want to perform and simply want volunteers to perform on the one hand and if it is not an effective learning, growing experience.
RK: You spoke yesterday about the importance of developing a better educated citizen ultimately through these kinds of experiences.

DB: That's my Jeffersonian bias that you can't really have a thriving democracy unless you have an educated questioning public.

(End of Tape 2 - Side A)

Tape 2 - Side B

DB: ...as a part of public education, part of the public school systems. I don't know, I shouldn't say that. In what schools is there a full discussion, investigation, debate on the Bill of Rights? I mean I think this is one of our tragedies as a nation that we are not willing to fully analyze our heritage as a political democracy. The costs of that currently and in the future will be enormous in terms of participation and freedom.